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Abstract: The Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia have experienced internal challenges 
to their own unity and coherence for a long time. This work represents the analysis of these 
challenges, which can be defined, geopolitically speaking, as “hotspots”. Relying on the 
observations of Russian political scientists, the author of this work analysed the so-called “crisis 
potential” in four “hotspots” in the Russian Federation. In the Republic of Serbia, five areas are 
marked that emit instability and jeopardise (or can jeopardise) its unity, peace and prosperity. 
Certain similarities are found between the compared “hotspots”, and differences as well. The 
region of North Caucasus is marked as the most dangerous “hotspot” in the Russian Federation, 
which has not been completely solved yet by the Russian federal authorities, due to the constant 
terrorist attacks. The purpose of the attacks is to extort from Russia the withdrawal from the area 
and create conditions for the political independence. The author found a geopolitical analogy to the 
North Caucasus “hotspot” (Chechnya) in the Republic of Serbia on the territory of Kosovo and 
Metohija. In the conclusion, it is stated that, at present, disparate geopolitical processes are taking 
place in the two countries – the Federal Centre is strengthening in the Russian Federation and the 
Federal Subjects are losing their attributes of statehood, whereas in the Republic of Serbia, the 
centrifugal tendencies are gaining prominence that can completely fragment it. 
 
Key words: geopolitics, “hotspots”, separatism, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Serbia 
 
Introduction 
 
Owing to the combined action of the external geopolitical pressure and the 
internal socio-political contradictions at the beginning of the 1990s, two 
federative formations, the USSR and the SFRY, disintegrated into many “new” 
states. As independent states, the Republic of Serbia and the Russian Federation 
inherited a complex internal structure. According to the 1993 Constitution, the 
Russian Federation had 89 political-legal subjects (currently it has 83 subjects), 
whereas Serbia, as a republic, has had two autonomous provinces within its 
territory (and it used to be a part of the former two-member federation 
FRY/SM). Both countries feature ethno-religious diversity, with the undisputed 
numerical domination of Orthodox-Slav population, i.e. Russians in the Russian 
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Federation (approximately 80%) and Serbs in the Republic of Serbia (more than 
80% excluding Kosovo and Metohija where a complete census has not been 
carried out since 1981). Despite the relative ethnic homogeneity, both countries 
have faced internal geopolitical challenges (separatism, irredentism, statist 
movements), to their own territorial integrity and sovereignty in the last two 
decades. These challenges resulted from a combination of several factors, such 
as socialist heritage of “political-administrative feudalism”, growing 
international and interreligious tensions, awakened awareness among different 
ethnic groups (minorities) about their civilizational, national and religious 
identity, social misery and strong interference of foreign geopolitical “agents” 
(USA, EU, Turkey) that continuously insist on laxer and looser legal-political 
order of both the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia. Most often, 
these challenges have represented building blocks of wider geopolitical projects 
of redesigning the world map (programmes of so-called Great Albania, Great 
Hungary, Green Transversal, Great Turan or the Confederation of Mountain 
Peoples of the Caucasus). Their realization would significantly reduce the 
territory and the quality of the geo-strategic position of the Russian Federation 
and the Republic of Serbia. Almost as a rule, the “hotspots” occur on the 
peripheries of the two countries, in areas where both the Russian Federation and 
the Republic of Serbia are the most vulnerable and most susceptible to 
destabilization in terms of ethno-religious structure and demographic and social 
trends. Furthermore, it is a case of the areas which are generally important in 
terms of communication and infrastructure – they are crossed by transport lines, 
gas and oil pipelines that are not only of regional but also of (sub)continental 
importance. In spite of the variety of occurring challenges mentioned above, as 
well as geographical, political, economical, cultural and religious specificities of 
the areas where the challenges manifest, it is possible to define the concept of 
“hotspots” – the regions in which the local political elite or just a fraction of it, 
with the minor or major participation of the local population, (non)violently 
questions the existing constitutional order of the country in which it lives by 
demanding greater independence (autonomy), (con)federal unit status or 
secession. 
 
“Hotspots” in the Russian Federation 
 
In Russian professional community, texts on potential internal challenges to the 
unity of the Russian Federation appeared immediately after its independence. 
One of the most striking observations was the analysis of a Russian political 
scientist Alexei Salmin – “The Disintegration of Russia?“, which was published 
at the end of 1992, and republished several times afterwards. In spite of his 
perceptions that national-territorial problems and contradictions, without the Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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variety of circumstances, are not likely to become the cause of the disintegration 
of the Russian Federation (due to the lack of the so-called critical mass), Salmin 
singled out four “zones” of real or potential instability, in which the nationality 
factor played the role of a detonator or one of important driving forces: the north 
Caucasian knot, the Volga area knot, the Siberian/Trans-Baikal knot, and the 
northern belt (Salmin, 2002). 
 
It should be pointed out that, later, some other authors, in a similar way, 
observed some possible challenges to the unity of the Russian Federation, i.e. 
they referred to some “potential hotspots”. One of more prominent Russian 
authors of pro-Western inclinations, Dmitri Trenin, used to claim that there are 
several federal subjects in Russia where the domicile population is Muslim or 
Buddhist, and that “revival of Islam (and potentially Buddhist fermentation) has 
real implications for those republics and poses a major challenge to Russia” 
(Trenin, 2002). The best-known theoretician on (Neo)Eurasian issues, Aleksandr 
Dugin, in his fundamental work, “The Foundations of Geopolitics”, also marked 
several regions (North Caucasus, Tatarstan, Bashkirstan, Buryatia and Yakutia), 
which can contribute to the downfall of the Russian Federation due to the 
independency aspirations of their political elite (Dugin, 2000). All three 
“hotspot” identifications mentioned above are, geopolitically speaking, rather 
similar. Therefore, this analysis will capitalize on all the conceptual approaches 
mentioned above in combination, with the emphasis on Alexei Salmin's work. 
 
North Caucasus “hotspot” 
 
The most delicate “hotspot” represents the North Caucasus zone (number 1 in 
Figure 1), where several Russian federal units are situated, in which, apart from 
Northern Ossetia or Stavropol, Muslim population dominates or it is very 
considerable. Federal subjects (the Republic of Dagestan, Chechen Republic, the 
Republic of Ingushetia, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, the Republic of 
Karachaevo-Cherkessia, the Republic of Northern Ossetia-Alania, the Province 
of Stavropol), which are administratively united into a recently formed North 
Caucasus federal district, cover an area of about 170 000 km
2, which represents 
only 1% of the total territory of the Russian Federation. Among all the federal 
subjects mentioned above, Chechnya was the biggest security threat to the 
Russian Federation in the 1990s due to its paramilitary formations with 
thousands of well-armed members. As M. Grčić once observed separatism in 
Chechnya results from the republic’s ethnic structure and peripheral geographic 
position and a difficult accessibility to the mountainous areas of Caucasus, as 
well as strong anti-Russian tendencies among the Chechens (Grčić, 1995). 
Shortly after the disintegration of the USSR, a miniature republic (covering an Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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area of 15 600 km
2 with the population of 1 200 000) declared its independence 
from Moscow with pretensions to become a “Caucasus Piedmont” by gathering 
and uniting all mountain peoples into the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of 
the Caucasus. Chechnya “independence” was created in the atmosphere of 
terrorism, ethnic cleansing (the victims were largely the Russians, so, at present, 
the Chechens make more than 90% of the total republic's population), and 
complete legal anarchy. The influence of Islamic fundamentalism in the republic 
increased gradually, especially among the younger population, which was 
institutionally established by introducing shariah ruling at the beginning of 1999. 
The Russian Federation waged two wars to bring Chechnya back within its legal 
framework. The first war (1994-1996) was followed by changeable luck but also 
by the incompetent operation management by the Russians, which resulted in 
Khasavyurt Accord (1996), which symbolised de facto defeat of Russia and 
enabled the Chechen rebels to rest for the following three years. 
 
 
Figure 1. “Hotspots” in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, аccording to Salmin (2002) 
(1 – North Caucasus; 2 – Volga area; 3 – Siberian/Trans-Baikal, 4 – Northern belt) 
 
For the unity of the Russian Federation in the Caucasus zone, the year of 1999 
was crucial and momentous. Political destiny of the Russian part of Caucasus 
was no longer dealt with in Chechnya (it was temporarily lost for the Russian 
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Federation) but in Dagestan. A year before, in the capital city of Chechnya, 
Grozny, a so-called Congress of peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan was 
convened where the union of the two Russian federal units was openly 
advocated. Dagestan (covering an area of over 50 300 km
2 with the population 
of 2 700 000) has an especially important geo-strategic position, because of its 
access to the Caspian Sea and due to the fact that energetic infrastructure crosses 
its territory. Some of the Chechnya leaders were very aware of these facts, so in 
the summer of 1999 paramilitary formations of Chechnya entered the territory of 
Dagestan trying to turn the political situation of the republic completely in favor 
of the integration project, mentioned above. Had Moscow stayed indifferent to 
these actions and only passively observed the developments in Dagestan, its 
position in the North Caucasus would have been permanently undermined, while 
the centrifugal processes in the entire Russian Federation would have received 
strong impulses. The Second Chechen Campaign was waged in the last minute 
(1999-2000), in which the Chechen separatist military movement was defeated, 
though not crushed. If the Chechen-Dagestan integration project had been 
implemented, Chechen’s neighboring Republic of Ingushetia (covering an area 
of 3 600 km
2 with the population of 500 000) would not have easily resisted the 
“uniting waves”. 
 
The North Caucasus region even today represents a “hotspot” because all the 
three republics (Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan) are still a target of frequent 
terrorist attacks where both members of local security forces and numerous 
innocent civilians die. The official statistics indicate great unemployment, 
poverty and a lack of future prospects, which force younger population to turn to 
Islamic extremism and terrorism. However, it is difficult to have a clear picture 
on social conditions in this part of the Russian Federation because of the 
diffusion of so-called grey economy and criminal activities that bring profit. On 
the other hand, several factors contribute to the stabilization of geopolitical 
situations in the North Caucasus. Determined and uncompromising central 
power, when the integrity and the sovereignty of the Russian Federation are in 
question, is the main guarantee that the constitutional order in the region will be 
preserved. In the recent years, it has invested significant financial means in this 
area, which maintains relative social peace and “buys” political stability. In 
addition, traditionally strong tribal and clan relationships and rivalries and an 
unusual ethnic diversity in Dagestan (even 14 official languages) interfere with 
the geopolitical consolidation and homogenization of the North Caucasus 
Muslim peoples only on a religious basis. At present, there is no foreign country 
or a military-political alliance in the region and beyond, that would go into 
confrontation with the Russian Federation only to support secessionist 
tendencies of particular ethnicities in the Caucasus region (as it was the case Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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during the revolt of Albanians in Kosovo and later during the NATO 
aggression). However, in spite of all the positive aspects of the political situation 
in the North Caucasus, it is reasonable to expect that the region will continue to 
represent a “hotspot” in the following decades. 
 
Volga area “hotspot” 
 
Two federal units with the majority of population being Muslims – Tatarstan and 
Bashkirstan represented the Volga area “hotspot” (number 2 in Figure1). The 
two republics, located between the Volga River and the Ural mountains, 
represent a communication link of its kind between the European and the Asian 
parts of the Russian Federation. Salmin was also aware of this feature when he 
stated that the secession of the republics near the Volga River from the Russian 
Federation, would break basic transportation and energetic lines that stretch from 
the east to the west and from the north to the south (Salmin, 2002). Special 
persistence in confronting Moscow was shown by the ruling management of 
Tatarstan (covering an area of 67 800 km
2 with the population of about 3 800 
000). The Declaration of State Sovereignty was issued as far back as 1990. 
Special challenge to the integrity of the Russian Federation was the 1992 
Constitution with certain regulations of highly provoking nature. Article 61 of 
the Tatarstan Constitution stated that Tatarstan was a sovereign country, subject 
of public international law that is associated with the Russian Federation – 
Russia (Fyodorov, 2004). There was also a regulation in the constitution 
stipulating that only principles and standards of public international law had the 
supremacy over Tatarstan’s law, whereas the laws of the Russian Federation 
were not mentioned at all (Gladky, 2006). Federal centre and the republic’s 
leadership were able to reach an agreement on competence demarcation in 1994. 
However, the Tatarstan leadership significantly undermined, on a strategic level, 
the coherence, and the legal-political order of the Russian Federation, because 
Moscow was subsequently obliged to enter bilateral negotiations with other 
republics as well and do the competence demarcation. 
 
The confidence of Tatarstan political leadership resulted from several facts. In 
the Russian Federation, after Russians, Tatars are the second largest ethnic 
community with the population of 5.6 million. They are the heirs of a powerful 
country – the Khanate of Kazan, which was destroyed in 1552 during the reign 
of Ivan the Terrible. In the Russian Empire, the Tatars especially profited during 
the reign of Catherine II, when they acquired the rights to trade with the 
Muslims in Middle Asia and later they became the monopolists in the branch 
owing to their knowledge of Turkic languages and customs (Millar, 2004). This 
commercial rise enabled the Tatars to form business class and intellectual elite Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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so that they, due to their power, organization, and influence in the empire, rose 
above other Muslim ethnic minorities. The capital of Tatarstan – Kazan, has 
always been one of the most important cities in Russia (University was founded 
as far back as 1804), and an important commercial centre, a traffic hub, and later 
an industrial centre. 
 
In contrast to the Tatars, the Bashkirs are significantly smaller in number (about 
1 700 000), whereas the Republic of Bashkirstan is twice as big as the republic 
of Tatarstan (almost 143 000 km
2). The separatist energy of the Bashkirs, in 
addition to their sparsity, is significantly stifled with the fact that of around 4 
million citizens of this federal unit, only 30% is represented by the Bashkirs
2. 
They barely surpass the Tatars who represent 1/4 of the Bashkirstan population, 
and are left behind by the Russians who represent more than 1/3 of the 
Bashkirstan population. Nevertheless, the local political leadership, in the 1990s, 
diligently worked on the independence of Bashkirstan. Agencies of Germany, 
Hungary, Austria, and Finland opened in the capital city of Ufa. In addition, the 
republic intensified the contacts with Muslim countries, such as Uzbekistan, 
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia (Gladky, 2006). Given the fact that both republics 
(Tatarstan and Bashkirstan) have no immediate contact with the outside world, 
the Bashkir political leadership once insisted on trade in territories with the 
neighboring Russian region, Orenburg, which would enable Bashkirstan to 
border with Kazakhstan, only 50 km away from Bashkirstan (Trenin, 2002). 
Moscow stopped the trade because it realized that Bashkirstan (and directly 
Tatarstan) bordering with Kazakhstan would have fatal geopolitical 
consequences on the internal cohesion of the Russian Federation in the future. 
From the factors that once used to be advantageous for the Tatar-Bashkir 
integration, and secession from the Russian Federation or, at least an “exclusive 
status” in the Federation, the following should be mentioned: ethno-linguistic 
closeness of the two peoples and rebirth of Islam in both republics. In addition, 
both republics have been showing economic dynamism, so the statist tendencies 
have had specific economic grounds. However, several other factors largely 
impeded the realization of the scenario mentioned above. First of all, the 
majority of Tatars (over 60% of them) live outside Tatarstan, whereas about 
25% of declared Bashkirs live outside Bashkirstan (the percentage used to be 
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higher). Both republics are not ethnically homogeneous, which is especially the 
case for Bashkirstan where the Russians are the relative majority. In Tatarstan, 
the Tatar population acquired absolute numerical supremacy (about 53% of the 
local population) only recently. The relations between the Tatars and Bashkirs 
are far from ideal – unregulated status of the Tatar language (hence the 
unregulated status of the large Tatar community with the population of   
1 000 000) in Bashkirstan is one of the main barriers for bringing together the 
two peoples. In both federal units, local believers are institutionally separated 
into different Islamic communities. Finally, in every aspect, both minorities are 
more strongly integrated in the Russian society than the North Caucasus 
Muslims.  
 
However, the main obstacle for the realization of the sovereign-confederal 
aspirations in the two republics situated near Volga was the consolidation of the 
Russian country itself. By establishing seven federal districts in 2000 (today 
there are eight of them), a new cycle of recentralization of the country started. 
Republic constitutions were altered and brought into accord with the federal 
constitution. Finally, in 2010, there were some political changes in the 
leadership in both republics – pro-sovereign leaders were replaced with more 
modest politicians. At present, Tatarstan and Bashkirstan do not represent a 
“hotspot” because the times of the lax federal centre are over. Nevertheless, 
these two republics should not be categorized into, figuratively speaking, 
“extinct volcanoes”, but rather into dormant ones. In both republics, the 
percentage of the Russian population slowly but constantly decreases – in time, 
both Tatarstan and Bashkirstan will be more homogeneous societies, in ethno-
religious terms. If the Russian Federation enters the state of anarchy and 
weakness again, possible statist aspirations of the local elite would be more 
difficult to solve, than it used to be the case in the recent history. 
 
Siberian/Trans-Baikal “hotspot” 
 
The Buddhist republics (Khakassia is the exception, in terms of religion), placed 
mostly near the country’s border with Mongolia in the east of Russia, 
represented a distinctive “hotspot” (number 3 in Figure 1). Salmin (2002) named 
the area “Siberian/Trans-Baikal knot” in which Tuva, Buryatia and Khakassia 
stand out because of their size and large population. The Republic of Tuva has 
some  tradition of independence (1921-1944) only becoming the part of the 
USSR during the World War II. With an area of 170 000 km
2 and population of 
only 300 000, in anthropogeographical sense, this republic is a characteristic 
case for the entire Siberian macro region (vast area with sparse population). 
Politically speaking, Tuva was to some extent analogous to Tatarstan with the Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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constitution that was unsurpassable because of the sovereign pretensions. 
Already in the first chapter of the Tuva constitution, Tuva was stated to be a 
sovereign democratic country within the Russian federation with the right to 
self-determination and the secession from the Russian Federation through a 
national referendum. In addition, the constitution of this federal unit contained a 
great amount of extreme ideas, such as – the local parliament had the authority 
to deal with the issues of war and peace (Gladky, 2006). In the Republic of 
Tuva, the Russian population is in absolute minority (20% of the local 
population), whereas the domicile Tuvinians represent more than 3/4 of the 
population. In the last two decades, a series of confrontations between the 
Russians and the Tuvinians has been registered. The percentage of the Russian 
population is in constant decrease, as well as the number of Tuvinians speaking 
Russian language. It is the case of one of the most isolated regions in the 
Russian Federation, in which the autochthonous Turkophone Buddhist 
population (with a significant percentage of shamanists, author’s remark) 
according to a researcher gravitates towards Mongolia rather than Russia 
(Stepanov, 1994). After 2000, under the pressure from Moscow, Tuva was 
obliged to alter all the articles in the constitution that were not in accord with the 
federal constitution, including the regulation on secession from the Russian 
Federation. However, as far as the ethnic structure is concerned, the situation 
remains the same.  
 
In addition to Tuva, the Republic of Buryatia represented a possible “hotspot,” 
even though the aspirations of the local political elite and the population were of 
significantly moderate character which is logical because even 2/3 of the 
population are of Russian ethnicity. Buryatia surpasses Tuva both in area 
coverage (351 000 km²), and population number (over 960 000 people) but the 
domicile Buryats in their home federal unit are less than 30% (about 280 000 
people). While D. Trenin claims that the Buryats were generally oriented 
towards joining two Buryat autonomous districts outside Buryatia to the 
homeland (which later lost that status, author’s remark) (Trenin, 2002), other 
authors state that there are ideas of joining Buryatia to Mongolia, because 
Buryats, who are Buddhists, have a lot in common with Mongolian population 
(Stepanov, 1994). Nevertheless, small percentage of Buryats in their own 
republic and a relatively strong Russian population block, impede stronger 
manifestations of separatist tendencies in this Russian federal unit. In the 
Republic of Khakassia (covering an area of over 61 000 km², population of 
about 540 000), assumptions for a stronger separatist sovereign movement are 
even smaller, because the Russian population has an absolute dominance in this 
republic (about 80%) whereas Khakass (a Turkophone ethnicity dominated by 
Shamanism and Orthodoxy) only comprise 12%. Some authors noticed in Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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Khakass a tendency to join the Panturkic movement (Stepanov, 1994). By 
themselves, these regions cannot represent independent “hotspots” nor do they 
have the potential of their own to create and emit crises and ethno-political 
tensions to other Russian regions. However, in case of the downfall of the 
political hierarchy or the strong pressure imposed by the external “geopolitical 
players” (China, USA), the statist aspirations in Buddhist regions of the Russian 
Federation could come to life again. Nonetheless, compared to the North 
Caucasus “hotspot” or the “dormant” Volga area separatism, this area does not 
represent nor it will in near future a significant challenge to the constitutional 
order, sovereignty, and integrity of the Russian Federation.  
 
Northern belt “hotspot” 
 
According to Salmin (2002), the fourth “belt of instability” could be “the chain 
of the northern regions” of the Russian Federation, from the Komi Republic in 
the west to the Chukotka and Koryak аutonomous districts in the east. In 
Salmin’s analysis, the reason for potential separatism (isolationism) of these 
areas can be found in the domain of economy rather than in the inter-ethnic 
conflicts. The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) was prominent in the past as a leader 
of “North Confederalism”. It is a vast republic with over 3 000 000 km
2 of area 
coverage and the population of less than 1 000 000. On the other hand, Yakutia 
is an extremely wealthy area – 99% of the Russian diamond is produced here, 
24% of gold and 33% of silver. Coal, gas, and wood exploitation is also well 
developed (Millar, 2004). The combination of the sparse population and 
enormous natural resources tempted the local leadership during the Russian 
anarchy in the 1990s to become more distant from the federal centre and thus 
keep all the income from natural resources exploitation for the republic. Owing 
to the support the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) gave to the political leadership in 
Moscow, it was given the right in 1993 to control a part of the gold and diamond 
production and make economic relations with foreign countries and investors 
(Gladky, 2006). Even though there were some inter-ethnic tensions, they never 
gave rise to an overt conflict. However, ethnic structure in the republic has 
experienced changes. The percentage of the Russians in the population of 
Yakutia dropped to below than 50% between 1989 and 2002, whereas, at the 
same time, the percentage of Yakuts increased from 33.4 to 45.5. Sparse 
population, harsh climate, transportation isolation and significant Russian 
population represented a specific barrier for the independence aspiration of the 
local elite. However, Yakut statist tendencies were downgraded to a minimum 
only after the change of policy in Moscow itself, i.e. after 2000, when some 
contracts between the federal centre and Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) were 
annulled. In addition to Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), in 1990s several other Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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regions in the north of Russia abundant with natural resources had grounds for 
“economic nationalism”, such as Komi Republic (covering an area of 416 800 
km
2 with the population of less than 1 000 000). However, characteristic features 
for all these regions – relatively low percentage of the non-Russian 
autochthonous population in the total population of the northern regions, the 
majority of Russian population and the lack of independence tradition – 
completely impede their potential for any kind of separatism. To sum up, the 
“northern belt” of republics and autonomous districts in the Russian federation 
represents a macro region that can jeopardize, in the least, the unity of the 
Russian state. 
 
“Hotspots” in the Republic of Serbia 
 
Kosovo and Metohija 
 
Without a doubt, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija represent 
the biggest and most dangerous “hotspot” in the Republic of Serbia (number 1 in 
Figure 2). In spite of the self-proclaimed independence on February 17
th 2008, 
Kosovo and Metohija is treated in this analysis as a crisis area in the Republic of 
Serbia. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, it is the case of a unilateral secession 
that is not recognized by the Republic of Serbia. Secondly, in spite of the high 
aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians to become a member of the UN, there are 
no future prospects for this “para-state” to become a part of the World Nation 
Organization. 
 
The territory of Kosovo and Metohija covers an area of 10 887 km
2 and it 
represents 12.3 % of the total area of the Republic of Serbia. There are no 
precise data on the population number but only various assumptions. The last 
official census that included Albanian population was carried out in 1981. 
According to the census, the total population in the province was 1 600 000. The 
Albanians represented 1 200 000, i.e. 77.4% whereas the Serbs (with the 
Montenegrins) represented 240 000 or almost 15%. Because of the Albanians’ 
boycott to 1991 census, Demographic Research Centre had to estimate the 
number of Kosovo Albanians which was 1 596 072, whereas the number of the 
Serbs (with the Montenegrins) decreased to 215 000 (Krstić, 2000). According 
to “a school of thought”, the 1981 census results were incorrect, because the 
census was carried out under Albanian organization that deliberately increased 
the population number in order to gain the status of constitutional nationality in 
Yugoslavia and right of secession. Number estimations from 1991 only represent 
false figures based on the incorrect data from the previous census. As a result, no 
further speculations on the population number in Kosovo and Metohija based on Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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the 1981 census and estimation from 1991 are valid. According to this concept, 
the number of Kosovo Albanians does not reach even to 1 500 000. Another 
“school of thought” accepts the census results and estimations mentioned above 
and on the grounds of the data speculate on the total population number in 
Kosovo and Metohija, and on the total percentage of Albanians as well. 
According to the 2009 Population Reference Bureau report, the total population 
number in Kosovo and Metohija is 2 200 000 (PRB, 2009), which suggests the 
conclusion that only Kosovo Albanians represent 1 800 000 to 1 900 000. 
Nevertheless, there are three undisputed facts. Firstly, there has not been a 
reliable and a complete census carried out in Kosovo and Metohija for at least 
three decades. Secondly, the population number of Kosovo Albanians is 
definitely above 1 million but significantly below 2 million. Thirdly, in terms of 
ethnic structure, the area of Kosovo and Metohija is rather homogenous as far as 
the nationality is concerned (the percentage of the Albanian population in the 
southern Serbian province is comparable with the percentage of Serbs in the 
Republic of Serbia excluding Kosovo and Metohija). 
 
Data reference on the ethnic structure of the population is relevant for the 
understanding of this “hotspot”, because the numerical dominance of the 
Albanians gives them the reason to demand independence from the Republic of 
Serbia. Even though some Serbian authors talk about Albanian ethnic right in 
Kosovo and Metohija (Krstić, 2000) because of their numerical supremacy, it is 
considered that this right should not be accepted as valid, because the numerical 
imbalance between the Albanians and Serbs is largely created with violence in 
various shapes (such as murders, pogroms, property usurpation, mistreating 
causing “willing departures” and albanisation of the Serbs). In other words, only 
the fact about the Albanian numerical dominance is undisputed, but this fact 
does not imply the ethnic right to the territory of Kosovo and Metohija because, 
as previously mentioned, the Albanian numerical supremacy has been achieved 
mostly by violence that, by all means, cannot be justified nor legally valued. 
 
Nowadays, Kosovo and Metohija reminds of Chechnya in the 1990s, due to its 
political, economic and social characteristics. The ethnic structure, already 
inconvenient to the Serbs, was additionally worsened because of the 
uncontrolled violence first in the summer and autumn of 1999 after the 
withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police, and then later in 
March pogroms in 2004, due to mass deportation of the Serbian population. 
Similar to rebellious Chechnyan political leadership, Albanian leadership is not 
able to create normal conditions to live and work in the province, even though 
they have had a decade of complete independence from Belgrade. 
Unemployment is estimated among the 50% of the working population. As in Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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Chechnya once, tribal-criminal clans, who often conflict with each other over the 
distribution of illegal income, govern the province. 
 
 
Figure 2. “Hotspots” in the Republic of Serbia (1 – Kosovo and Metohija; 2 – Preševo and 
Bujanovac; 3 – Raška region; 4 – AP Vojvodina; 5 – Area of Hungarian ethnic majority) 
 
For the vast amount of narcotics that come to the European market, mostly from 
Afghanistan, so-called Kosovo represents a crucial transit point. In addition to 
drug trafficking, in Kosovo and Metohija, weapon trafficking and sex trafficking 
are also widespread. So-called Kosovo State possesses its own police formations 
(Kosovo Police Force) and military formations (Kosovo Defend Corpus), which 
mostly consist of the former members of the “Kosovo Liberation Army” (the 
KLA) which is categorized as a terrorist organization by the most unbiased 
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political analysts. In addition to being a haven for crime of any kind, as 
Chechnya used to be, Kosovo is also a gathering place for Islamic 
fundamentalists (the Wahhabi) who advocate religious extremism, intolerance 
and so-called Holy War – Jihad. By the European standards, the so-called state 
of Kosovo is a genuine “hotspot” because of unusual concentration of organized 
crime, paramilitary formations, Islamic radicalism, poverty, unemployment, high 
population growth, and the permanent violence inflicted on the non-Albanian 
population.  
 
In geopolitical terms, for the Republic of Serbia, it is inconvenient that its 
southern province borders the Republic of Albania, which represented the major 
logistic support for the Kosovo Albanians in their fight for secession. During the 
1990s, Albania was the main provider of weaponry to the KLA, a proving 
ground for the military training of the KLA members and a meeting place for 
Islamic volunteers who together with the local Albanians took part in actions 
against the police and military forces of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, respectively. Rebels in Chechnya sought a logistic 
support in not-always-reliable Georgia with which this Russian federal unit 
shares about 80 km long border. In contrast to them, military formations of 
Albanian separatists in Kosovo and Metohija always counted on the safe shelter 
of the neighboring Albania, a country they consider as a motherland and a 
“natural ally.” In the following years, by building modern transportation lines, 
bridges and tunnels, Albania and Kosovo and Metohija could integrate even 
more into an indivisible territory, in terms of communication, geo-strategy, and 
geo-economy. 
 
The chances of the republic of Serbia to neutralize this “hotspot” are exclusively 
bound to its internal rebirth (economic, demographic, and military) and a radical 
transformation of power relations in the world, which would diminish the 
importance and power of the current sponsors of Kosovo independence, the most 
important of which is the USA. For now, the current situation goes in favor of 
the Albanian secession. If the current demographic trends remain the same, in 
the following decades the Republic of Serbia will find it difficult to regain and 
absorb its southern province into its own political-legal order. According to the 
projections of the Population Reference Bureau, in 2050 so-called Kosovo State 
will have the population of 3.2 million, and the rest of the republic of Serbia will 
have the population of only 5.9 million. Young people will be dominant in the 
Kosovo population, whereas the Serbian population will mostly comprise of 
senior citizens. Even if the predictions are wrong, i.e. if the population number 
of the southern province is unjustifiably increased, tendencies that lead to a 
decreasing numerical difference between the Serbian and Albanian population Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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are undisputed. Stepić made a good observation saying that Kosovo and 
Metohija has turned from a centre of the Serbian country into its territorial and 
ethnic periphery (Stepić, 2004). Main economic and population centers in Serbia 
nowadays are Belgrade with the surrounding area and the territory of Vojvodina 
(especially the area Belgrade-Novi Sad), whereas the areas bordering Kosovo 
and Metohija, such as the districts of Jablanica and Pčinja, experience economic 
and demographic downfall. Factors that go in favour of the integration of 
Kosovo and Metohija into the legal-political order of the Republic of Serbia are 
as follows: clan-tribal divisions in the Albanian community (which seriously 
damages its internal political coherence), progressive social atomization, women 
emancipation, and widespread social deviations, which altogether can 
significantly diminish the demographic potential of Kosovo Albanians.  
 
Preševo and Bujanovac 
 
Next “hotspot” can be found in the two municipalities in the southernmost part 
of the Republic of Serbia – Preševo and Bujanovac, largely inhabited by the 
Albanian population (number 2 in Figure 2). Albanians approximately make 
90% of the population in the municipality of Preševo (according to the 2002 
census there were almost 35 000 people). Data from the same census show that 
the ethnic structure in Bujanovac is more balanced (the population of 43 000 
comprises 55% of Albanians, 34% of Serbs and 9% of the Romanies). The two 
municipalities covering an area of 725 km
2 (Bujanovac 461 km
2 and Preševo 
264 km
2) have an extremely important geopolitical position – along the 
international corridor E-10 that connects Belgrade, Skopje, Thessaloniki, and 
Athens. Local Albanian communities in the two municipalities demanded 
several times, through their political representatives, the demilitarization of the 
area (still called “The Valley of Preševo” or “Eastern Kosovo” by the 
Albanians), and the withdrawal of the police force. In addition, they also 
demanded from the International Community to interact as a mediator and the 
distribution of the international forces, as well. Their main objective is the 
formation of a special autonomous district, which would have the right to merge 
with the so-called Kosovo State. Political aspirations of the local Albanians 
transformed in the last months of 2000 into an armed rebellion of the Liberation 
Army of Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac, which was repressed in relatively 
short time. However, the area remains a “hotspot” due to sporadic terrorist 
attacks, political provocation of great proportions (putting up the flag of Albania 
on its public holiday) and due to the organized crime, that is connected to that of 
Kosovo and Metohija. Unless the Republic of Serbia does not regain the factual 
sovereignty over Kosovo and Metohija in the following decades, the status of the 
two municipalities could become more problematic. Albanian geopolitical Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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spreading and penetration towards Preševo, Bujanovac, Kumanovo, and a 
potential territorial contact with Bulgaria would have unforeseen and historically 
justified negative geopolitical and geo-strategic consequences to the Serbian 
existential interests (Stepić, 2004). By Albanian-Bulgarian merger, the potential 
for creating the geopolitical axis Belgrade-Athens through the territory of the 
Republic of Macedonia, would be lost.  
 
Raška region 
 
While the municipalities of Preševo and Bujanovac border in the southeast with 
Kosovo and Metohija, as a major “hotspot” in the Republic of Serbia, the 
Medieval Serbian “heartland” – Raška region borders with the southern province 
in the northwest (number 3 in Figure 2). Historical-geographic Raška region 
stretches nowadays both in Serbia and Montenegro. The Serbian part of once 
called Sandžak of Novi Pazar comprises six municipalities (Novi Pazar, Sjenica, 
Tutin, Prijepolje, Priboj, and Nova Varoš) with an area of about 4500 km
2. 
Treating the Raška region as a “hotspot” is justified because of the open 
demands of Bosniac/Muslim religious-political elite for a special status of so-
called Sandžak (the Turkish term for an administrative area) with the 
characteristics of an autonomy or a federal unit. In the days of the FRY, i.e. 
Serbia and Montenegro, the demands for the autonomy of the so-called Sandžak 
had more chances for the realization. Nowadays, when the region is divided by 
the two independent countries, the aspirations of the Bosniac/Muslim religious-
political leadership in the Republic of Serbia are oriented towards gaining a 
special status for the municipalities mentioned above or creating a so-called 
Coterminous Autonomy (similar to the South Tyrol model). According to the 
2002 census, in the Serbian part of the Raška region, the population is about 235 
000, 142 000 of which are Bosniacs/Muslims. In the three municipalities of the 
region, Bosniac/Muslim population represents a majority (Novi Pazar, Sjenica, 
and Tutin). Bosniacs/Muslims are especially dominant in the municipality of 
Tutin where they represent over 90% of the total population, while only in the 
municipality of Novi Pazar almost 70 000 members of this ethnic community are 
concentrated (65 593 Bosniacs and 1 599 Muslims) or over 40% of the total 
Bosniac/Muslim population in the entire region (the Serbian part). Promoting 
their slight numerical supremacy and the fact that Sandžak of Novi Pazar was a 
special administrative region in the Ottoman Empire, leading Bosniac/Muslim 
political organisations carried out an illegal referendum on the autonomy of 
Sandžak in 1991. The refusal of the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia 
to accept the results of that referendum forced the autonomous-statist aspirations 
to be put aside. About twenty years later, the concept of so-called Sandžak as a 
special region was re-actualized in the political platforms of the leadership in Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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Islamic society in Serbia and of some Bosniac/Muslim Non-governmental 
Organisations. The main argument for the region’s exclusive status are the 1991 
referendum results, mentioned above, in which more than 90% of the citizens 
supposedly declared for the complete autonomy of the so-called Sandžak. 
 
Political atmosphere in this region is additionally strained by the bad social-
economic situation. The Raška region is the one of the poorest regions in the 
Republic of Serbia. Only in Novi Pazar, there are over 20 000 unemployed. The 
figures seem especially dramatic, if it is taken into account that the municipality 
has the population less than 90 thousand (2002 census). The town that was once 
known as a regional centre and a leader in textile and footwear industry has 
experienced an economic collapse in the last ten years. The situation is not better 
in other municipalities of Raška region as well including those where the 
majority of the population is Bosniac/Muslim (Tutin and Sjenica). A significant 
part of the population solves the existential problems by turning to illegal 
activities. A great amount of narcotics distributed from Kosovo and Metohija 
across Europe goes through the territory of Raška region. In addition to drug 
trafficking, weapon-, food-, medicine-, and oil derivate-trafficking are also 
present. Besides organized crime, religious fundamentalism and the existence of 
Islamic radical groups (Wahhabi) are increased as well, especially in the three 
municipalities with the majority of Bosniac/Muslim population. In 2007 near 
Novi Pazar, an armed conflict broke out between members of Wahhabi fraction 
and the officials of the Ministry of the Interior, in which the leader of the local 
Wahhabis got killed in gunfire. In addition to the incident, on several occasions, 
the police force arrested the extremists and confiscated their weaponry. To sum 
up, the Raška region represents a zone of high security risks for the Republic of 
Serbia in the years to come, because of the dangerous concentration of 
secessionist aspirations of the local Bosniac/Muslim religious-political elite, 
religious extremism, widespread crime, social misery, and unemployment. The 
fulcrum for the Republic of Serbia for keeping its own integrity and sovereignty 
in the Raška region is the fact that domicile local Bosniac/Muslim population is 
strictly divided in two Islamic communities that compete with each other for the 
spiritual leadership. The mutual antagonism is so severe, that it will within 
certain time impede the political homogenization of the Bosniac/Muslim 
population. In addition, the percentage of the Serbian population in the entire 
region is still significant – it represents the part of the Serbian nation that is 
extremely devoted to its motherland and wholeheartedly interested in its stability 
and unity.  
 
Geopolitically speaking, especially unfavorable fact for Republic of Serbia is 
that the Raška region and the municipalities of Preševo and Bujanovac have an Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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immediate territorial contact with Kosovo and Metohija. Hypothetically 
speaking, the three hotspots could form in future, a unique geopolitical zone in 
which Albanian separatists and Bosniac/Muslim extremists could act in co-
ordination with the intention of fragmenting the Republic of Serbia on territories 
analyzed. In other words, the creators of instability mentioned above could 
merge the three “hotspots” into one, from the Macedonian border to the border 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Generation of this “crisis belt” with an area of 16 
000 km
2 fits into the wider geo-strategic platform of creating a compact “chain” 
of territories with the dominant Islamic population from the north-westernmost 
part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Bosphorus, i.e. creating the so-called “Green 
Transversal.” The three presented  “hotspots” represent a key geopolitical 
“buckle” for the realization of this Pan-Islamic Project. 
 
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina 
 
A potential “hotspot” in the Republic of Serbia can even be found in the 
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (an area of 21 506 km
2 and the population 
of slightly more than 2 million) (number 4 in Figure 2). In contrast to Kosovo 
and Metohija, Raška region and Preševo-Bujanovac region, in the northern 
Serbian province the existence of Islamic radicals or paramilitary formations is 
not registered. In addition, the problems of unemployment, social misery, and 
poverty are less pronounced than in the regions mentioned above. Ethnic 
structure in the northern province goes in favor of the state interests of the 
Republic of Serbia. Serbian population is the majority and represents 2/3 of the 
total population. This region appears not to have any kind of challenges to the 
unity and the constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia. However, this is not 
the case. 
 
The Republic of Serbia, when it was the constituent of Socialist Yugoslavia, had 
two separate administrative districts within its borders – Vojvodina and Kosovo 
and Metohija. Over time, the two districts acquired more competence – a process 
which would culminate in 1974 when the Federal and Republic Constitution 
were adopted (Popov, 2000) giving the provinces many republic jurisdictions. 
This legal-political system was to be cancelled only in 1990, when a new 
Serbian Constitution was adopted. Simultaneously with the outbreak of political 
crisis and secessionist tendencies in the Yugoslav Federation, political ideas and 
organizations were formulated in Vojvodina, advocating the return of the 1974 
Constitution model, i.e. the federalization of Serbia. During the 1990s, their 
influence was weak, but after 2000, the ideas of redesigning the Serbian 
Constitution that would threaten the republic’s unity, began to gain weight. A 
fact that the Vojvodina is more developed than the Republic in general, stands Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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out as the main reason for stronger and wider institutional independence. At first 
glance, considering the Russia’s political “hotspots”, a parallel can be drawn 
between Yakutia and Vojvodina, because the “economic nationalism” in this 
Russian federal unit was also the main motive for the local political elite to 
demand a privileged status for their republic. However, whereas Republic of 
Sakha (Yakutia) is abundant in diamond, gold, silver, oil, gas, and coal, 
Vojvodina has none of the mentioned, or, at least, not in larger amounts (oil and 
gas). As an agricultural region, it has been a victim for decades, but not of Serbia 
and its hegemony, but rather a victim of ideological economic politics, which, by 
exploiting the village, developed urban centers, industry, and infrastructure. 
Besides relatively agreeable natural conditions for agriculture, the territory of 
Vojvodina is devoid of other resources (energy substances, ores, forests, hydro-
energetic potential) and only with the rest of the Republic of Serbia can create a 
valuable geo-economic territory characterized by diversity and mutual 
complementation. 
 
Another supposed reason for statist pretensions in Vojvodina lies in the forming, 
or, according to some authors, already formed so-called Vojvodinian identity. 
Historians, Jelena and Čedomir Popov, managed to demonstrate and prove 
convincingly in their study that the concept of autonomous Vojvodina had been 
throughout history a Serbian idea in its essence. It was mainly concerned with 
regulating the status of the Serbs in the Habsburg Empire (1848 May Assembly 
resolution on creating Serbian Vojvodina; 1849 Wien Resolution on creating the 
Duchy of Serbia and Tamiš Banat) (Popov, 2000). After uniting Vojvodina with 
Serbia in 1918, the issue of Vojvodina’s essential autonomy is inappropriate. In 
the last years, Belgrade (and not Novi Sad – the capital of the province) sends 
major impulses for the independence of Vojvodina, which reminds of the period 
in the 1990s, when the Russian political leadership sent the message to the elite 
of the republics – “take as much sovereignty as you can digest” (Dushenko, 
2005). Vojvodinian political elite estimated that it could take over more than 150 
competences from the republic, including the right to establish its own regional 
agencies abroad, to have its own source of income, Academy of Science, and the 
development bank. Serbian Parliament accepted the Statute of Vojvodina with 
only minor modifications in 2009 and consented to set foundations for a new 
country within the territory of the Republic of Serbia; i.e. to establish the 
administrative (the government, ministries, province agencies), diplomatic 
(regional agencies), financial (development bank), and symbolic (the flag and 
the coat of arms) state-building infrastructure. The proof that statist ambitions in 
some Vojvodinian political circles are not fulfilled with this solution is the 
project of the “Federal Republic of Serbia” which would be constituted of two 
federal entities – Vojvodina and Serbia (Berisavljević, 2010). It takes only one Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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step from this type of “federation” to a complete secession of Vojvodina from 
the Republic of Serbia. As a paradox, it could happen under the circumstances 
when the Serbian ethnic population has never been larger in Vojvodina. 
 
Area of Hungarian ethnic majority 
 
Finally, a possible political “hotspot” in Serbia could be found in eight 
municipalities in the northern part of Vojvodina, mainly populated by the 
Hungarian national minority (number 5 in Figure 2). In six of them, the 
Hungarians represent an absolute majority of the population (Kanjiža, Senta, 
Ada, Bačka Topola, Mali Iđoš, Čoka), and in the remaining two, they are the 
relative majority (Subotica, Bečej). The biggest problem of the Hungarian ethnic 
community in Serbia is not the violation of their rights, but a continuous 
population decline, which decreases the percentage of the Hungarians in the total 
population of Vojvodina (and Serbia, in general). According to 2002 census, the 
percentage of the Hungarian community in the total population of the Republic 
of Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohija) was only 3.9 (about 293 000), 
whereas in the northern province the percentage does not reach to 15 (290 000). 
That the Hungarian population has significantly decreased in number is proved 
by the fact that after World War II, almost 430 000 Hungarians lived in Serbia 
(Vojvodina). Only between the two censuses (1991 and 2002) the number of this 
ethnic community decreased by almost 50 000. The reasons for such a ethno-
demographic trend are threefold. Firstly, the poor birth growth. Secondly, the 
part of the Hungarian community assimilated through mixed-nationality 
marriages. Thirdly, the departure of the Hungarians abroad, especially to their 
motherland, has increased in the last two decades. 
 
As a reaction to this problem, political organization of the Hungarian ethnic 
minority demanded improvement of the minority rights and insisted on the 
opportunity to realize their personal (cultural) autonomy in the domains of 
education and media. They also demanded the creation of a territorial autonomy 
or the so-called Hungarian Autonomous District encompassing the eight 
municipalities mentioned above with Subotica as the seat. The creation of an 
autonomy with an accent on ethnicity within Vojvodina is not supported by the 
national majority (the Serbs), nor even by the supporters of the federalization of 
the Republic of Serbia, because  institutional and territorial selection of the 
Hungarians in the northern Serbian province would demystify the concept of 
“Vojvodinian identity” which both the Serbs and Hungarians supposedly share. 
Individuals and some political groups of Vojvodinian Hungarians advocate the 
revision of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which determined present Hungarian 
borders, in order to recover all “lost” territories under Budapest jurisdiction. Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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Recently, political subjects of Vojvodinian Hungarians, instead of a direct 
support for territorial autonomy, take the longer, albeit more productive way 
from their point of view – they strongly support all sovereign demands sent from 
Novi Sad to Belgrade, hoping that they would more easily realize their own 
geopolitical goals in additionally fragmented Serbia. This kind of reasoning 
among the leaders of Vojvodinian Hungarians is definitely logical – Hungarian 
ethnic community could be a more influential political factor in “independent” 
Vojvodina (with the population of almost 15%) than in the entire Republic of 
Serbia where its population does not reach to 5%. Besides, when the issues of 
the status and positions of Vojvodinian Hungarians are on the agenda, the 
chances are bigger that this ethnic group will make a better institutional 
arrangement for its own sake if Hungary directly confronts with “independent 
Vojvodina” than with the unified and strong Republic of Serbia. Thus, the future 
of this potential “hotspot” will primarily depend on the ability of the Republic of 
Serbia and the Serbian nation to survive on the international scene as a 
respectable geopolitical agent.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As it can be noticed, the Russian “hotspots” were discussed in the Past Tense. 
Serbian crisis areas were mentioned both in the historical context and from the 
present and future perspective. The Republic of Serbia entered the last decade of 
the 20
th century with a new constitution that homogenized the country in the 
political-territorial sense. Since 1999 NATO aggression, the geopolitical tissue 
of the Serbian country has slowly but constantly disintegrated. In the Russian 
case, the sequence of events was completely reverse. As Russian authors tend to 
point out, it all started with the “sovereignty parades”, anarchy and the self-will 
of the local political structures. Then, in 1999, the internal consolidation of the 
Russian Federation started with the military intervention in Chechnya. We are 
the witnesses of two completely divergent processes – in the first one, the 
country disintegrates itself because of external pressure and internal 
contradictions, whereas in the other, political situations are shaped in completely 
divergent way – the country’s centre strengthens and takes strategic decisions 
with the loyal following of the federal subjects. This insight does not imply that 
the Russian Federation definitely solved its problems (danger and challenges) of 
the disintegration in political-territorial and ethno-religious senses. Russian 
geopolitical surroundings are expansive in nature (military expansion of the 
West, strengthening of the Islamic world, unprecedented rise of China), and in 
combination with the “weak” federal centre, the factor of external pressure can 
crucially contribute in the possible re-fragmentation of the Russian Federation in 
the future. So far, current tendencies in international relations go in favor of the Vuković, N.: Comparative geopoliticalanalysis of “hotspots” in... 
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Russian Federation in maintaining the status quo (one existing and three solved 
hotspots). Strategic prospects of Serbia are more uncertain, which is reasonable 
if the size and power of both the republic of Serbia and the Russian Federation 
are taken into consideration. In addition, the aggravating factor for the Republic 
of Serbia is that its “hotspots” are in immediate territorial contact (three in the 
south and two in the north) whereas the “hotspots” in Russia are geographically 
disperse without the possibility of closer communication and co-ordination. 
Finally, in both cases compared in this analysis, the population number is of 
great importance. The Russian federation with the population of over 140 
million can easily deal with the separatism in Chechnya that has the population 
of barely 1 million, whereas the Republic of Serbia with the population of 7.4 
million (excluding Kosovo and Metohija) will find it difficult to deal with the 
statist aspirations of Kosovo Albanians who are comparable to the Chechens in 
number.  
 
The prognosis of future political, demographic, and safety trends represents the 
most challenging and riskiest part of a geopolitical analysis. Judging the 
historical experience and the recent events, one thing is almost certain. The 
international setting, in which the Republic of Serbia will have to face internal 
challenges to its unity, greatly depends on the “overall strength” of the Russian 
Federation as a democratic, and a prosperous country, which solved all its 
“hotspots”. Multidimensional Russian consolidation is definitely not a guarantee 
that the Republic of Serbia will easily neutralize all its crisis areas in the future, 
but it can be a vantage for it. Thus, on a higher, strategic level, political 
situations in the two countries and in the analyzed “hotspots” are in an 
immediate and partially interactive relationship. 
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